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Translating participatory budgeting in Russia:  
The roles of inscriptions and inscriptors 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The paper explores how participatory budgeting (PB) as a democratic governance tool 
has been translated within the Russian public sector by addressing the local specifics of its design 
and mobilization through the formation of networks. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a case study of one pioneering 
municipality. Data has been gathered through triangulation of interviews, document search, 
video and netnographic observations. By relying on ideas from actor-network theory, the study 
focuses on the relational and rhetorical work of human (allies/inscriptors) and non-human 
(inscriptions) actors involved in the development of PB in Russia.  
Findings – The findings indicate that the initial democratic values of PB underwent several stages 
of translation as a continuous inscription building process and the formation of networks. The 
main finding is that putting democratic idea(l)s of PB into practice proved problematic, since PB 
depended on many ‘allies’ which were not always democratic. Paradoxically, in order to launch 
democratic practices in Russia, PB relied largely on bureaucratic and even New Public 
Management inscriptions, which it was originally supposed to fight against. Notwithstanding, 
while these inscriptions can fog the democratic values of PB, they are also capable of uncovering 
its democratic potential over time, albeit not for a long time as the ‘external referee’ is needed. 
Originality/value – The paper juxtaposes PB development in Russia with the translation 
literature.  Not only does the study emphasize the role of human, but non-human actors as well.  
Keywords Participatory budgeting; Russian municipality; translation; democratic governance; 
actor-network; inscriptions.    
Paper type Research paper 
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Introduction 
Assiduous attempts have been made to reinvent the public sector worldwide, today including 
developing countries and emerging economies (van Helden & Uddin, 2016). A growing focus on 
what instruments/tools may be used in order to make the public sector more effective and 
responsive to current challenges of society with regard to democratic development has been 
documented in the research. In particular, one of the challenges has been a widening legitimacy 
gap between the citizenry and the representative ‘democratic’ governments (e.g. Box et al., 2001; 
Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2016; Nyamori et al., 2012). This issue has come to be known in the 
literature as “democracy crisis” (Fung, 2006). To deal with this crisis, public administration has 
been forced to move in novel directions, in so doing advocating governments to strengthen 
citizens’ accountability and be involved into government decision-making that is based on 
deliberation and collaboration.  
One practical consequence of this advocacy has been the worldwide endorsement of citizenry 
involvement mechanisms in governments (Fung, 2006, 2015; Fisher, 2012). In the aftermath of 
this, accounting and accountability tools such as participatory budgeting (PB) were propagated as 
a means to augment democratic values through deliberation. Although PB has a variety of 
meanings (see e.g. Sintomer et al., 2008), there is a common awareness that non-elected citizens 
should be somehow involved in the deliberation and negotiation of the public budget that may 
result in new forms of accountability relationships. That said, PB is intended to be a vital 
element/tool for promoting democratic governance, with its core values of democratic 
legitimacy, effectiveness, and social justice (Fung, 2015). However, despite the fact that 
democratic rhetoric of PB nowadays covers more than 1,500 cities around the globe (Baiocchi & 
Ganuza, 2014), there is an increasing awareness that there are many ‘underwater stones’ on the 
PB way. Reflecting on democratic governance values (Fung, 2015), the current stream of research 
argues that PB may actually end up with promoting external legitimacy, instead of democratic 
one (e.g. Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012), mixing effectiveness with efficiency (e.g. He, 2011; Irvin 
& Stansbury, 2004; Nyamori et al., 2012), as well as developing a symbolic social justice with the 
political elites at place (e.g. Harun et al., 2015; Uddin et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, despite the multidisciplinary nature, this literature is primarily limited to structural 
and political projections of an understanding of the problematic nature of PB. Therefore, the 
question of “how PB can develop the democratic rhetoric of citizens involvement into practice” 
remains unsolved. In particular, the PB literature is largely silent on how PB has been introduced, 
rather jumping into an analysis of the political or structural aspects (e.g. He, 2011; Kuruppu et al., 
2016). Moreover, with a very few exceptions, the public administratio  and political studies seem 
to be rather undertheorized with regard to PB’s nature and its underlying processes (e.g. Brun-
Martos & Lapsley, 2016). Conversely, accounting studies are deemed too much preoccupied with 
the issue of power in their theorizations (e.g. Célérier & Cuenca Botey, 2015; Harun et al., 2015). 
That mentioned, a few studies have so far addressed the micro-details of PB design and 
mobilization processes and their interaction with the local context (Musso et al., 2011; van 
Helden & Uddin, 2016). We argue that such studies can offer new insights into an understanding 
of the problematic nature of PB with regard to the development of democratic values in modern 
governments. This becomes especially relevant, when democratic innovations, such as PB, are 
not institutionally mandated and politicized from the very beginning. There are a bunch of 
examples around the world where NGOs, consultants and research groups, rather than solely a 
central elite, were the driving forces behind the PB (Baiocchi, 2015; Fung, 2015). Under these 
circumstances, PB rather develops itself as a result of various actors’ interactions within a specific 
country context where democratic governance agenda could be not the only one. Indeed, few 
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studies have empirically addressed the issues of what actors particularly do in order to articulate 
democratic innovations in a specific case, and how the PB development is influenced by the 
interaction between democratic, bureaucratic, and efficiency discourses on the ground (Ariely, 
2013; Im et al., 2014; Nabatchi, 2010; Neshkova, 2014; Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2016). In addition, 
little research has been undertaken on the role of non-human entities participating in these 
discourses. As some recent studies have manifested, such relationships expose the more 
nuanced/complex view on issues of the democratization and mediation potential of tools like PB, 
transcending traditionally revealed tensions and power struggles (Kornberger et al., 2017).  
Based on the mentioned above, this paper seeks to extend the previous literature observations 
on the problematic nature of PB with regard to the development of democratic values in modern 
governments. This is approached by more extensively addressing the local specifics of PB design 
and mobilization. The paper relies on the ideas of actor-network theory with its focus on the 
concept of translation (Latour, 1987, 1994, 2005). Such a conceptualisation not only enables to 
reveal the role of human actors in the development of PB democratic values but various non-
human actors/artefacts as well. In this study, translation is considered to be the relational and 
rhetorical work of human and non-human actors involved in the development, spread and 
acceptance of accounting inventions, such as PB in our case (Latour, 2005). To sum up, the main 
research question addressed in this study is how PB, as a democratic governance tool, has been 
translated within the public sector. 
Regarding an empirical setting, the PB practices of one Russian municipality were examined. The 
chosen municipality was among the country’s pioneers to begin experimentation towards PB, 
with the help of a locally operating research group. Based on the triangulation of 16 interviews, 
document search, video and netnographic observations, PB’s design and mobilization processes 
during a time-span of 2013–2017 were traced. The Russian context generally, and local 
government administration particularly, serve as a vivid example of bureaucratic government 
(Sytin, 2012) with the centralized management tradition, which is widely referred to in the 
literature as “vertical of power” (Zherebtsov, 2014). Moreover, the efficiency discourses 
propagated under the banner of New Public Management (NPM) are also evident in the Russian 
public sector. In particular, the case of Russian public-sector accounting reform vigorously 
supports this, showing that attempts to modernize public accounts in favor of accruals eventually 
led to a hierarchical mode of institutionalization which further resulted in local interpretations 
and the formation of hybrid practices (Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2013; Timoshenko & Adhikari, 
2009; Khodacheck and Timoshenko, 2017). Thus, the Russian context with its internal traditions, 
hybrid practices and discourses, presents a promising case for the investigation. Last, but not 
least, the research on recent developments in public sector accounting and budgeting in less-
developed economies is indeed in short supply (van Helden & Uddin, 2016).  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section first reviews the concepts of PB and 
democratic governance, and then presents theoretical lens through which to examine the 
translation of PB. In the section that follows, an overview of data capturing techniques pertinent 
to the study is undertaken. The research setting is then presented. The section afterwards 
discusses the main empirical findings. The penultimate section analyses the empirical findings, 
while the concluding section summarizes the major points of the study, as well as highlights 
possibilities for further research.   
  
Theory  
The problematic nature of PB as a tool to enhance democratic governance  
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The modern governments with their representative democracy structure are no longer capable of 
responding to the growing complexity of society (Warren, 2009; Klijn, 2012). This calls for a move 
to a novel paradigm/understanding of the role of citizenry in political institutions (Baiocchi & 
Ganuza, 2014). One of such paradigms nowadays is inextricably intertwined with the democratic 
governance agenda (Fung, 2015). The latter emphasizes democratic engagement, which fosters 
deliberative practices through the introduction of tools that deepen citizen participation in 
government processes (Fisher, 2012). One of such tools is PB that is intended to serve as a 
mediating instrument between the problematic world of government and democratic 
accountability (Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2016; Bryer, 2014). Despite the variety of designs 
(Sintomer et al., 2008), the previous research shows that PB can encourage the development of 
democratic values, as varied as democratic legitimacy, effective governance and social justice 
(Fung, 2015). However, a significant amount of multidisciplinary research has questioned 
democratic promises of PB, with often spotty and sometimes even detrimental outcomes 
documented all over the world (see Figure 1).  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
To begin with, some studies have shown that, along with the widening democratic legitimacy in 
the eyes of citizenry via the application of PB (Fung, 2015), authorities often adopted PB of a 
purely ceremonial nature (Adams, 2004; Im et al., 2014; Uddin et al., 2011) and used it as a 
powerful legitimation device for particular actions concerning the budget (Ahrens & Ferry, 2015). 
Next, effective governance agenda of PB, which stresses the role of citizenry as active 
contributors to complex problem solving at a government level (Fung, 2015), is also quite 
dubious. That said, a multitude of studies have challenged citizens’ competence/expertise in PB 
(Beckett & King, 2002; Hong, 2015; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004), where particular actors (e.g. 
technocrats) can dominate the decision-making process (Gusmano, 2013; Michels, 2011; Michels 
& De Graaf, 2010).  Furthermore, evidence exists indicating that effective governance can be 
easily overwhelmed by administrative and efficiency agendas (He, 2011; Rossmann & Shanahan, 
2012; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Nyamori et al., 2012). Lastly, a growing 
number of studies have expressed a strong skepticism about PB social justice potential, as 
bringing marginalised constituencies into decision-making process (Fung, 2015) can be rejected 
by dominant elites (Harun et al., 2015), or even help strengthen their positions (Célérier & 
Cuenca Botey, 2015; Kuruppu et al., 2016) under symbolic justice. 
It should be noted here that, while emphasizing the problematic nature of PB, the reviewed 
literature is largely silent on explaining the causes/reasons for such results, rather jumping into 
political aspects, structural explanations, or particular outcomes. Specifically, recent studies on 
PB in emerging and less developed countries have dealt with the problematic nature PB by 
relying on the issues of power and domination in their theorizations (Harun et al., 2015; Uddin et 
al., 2011; Kuruppu et al., 2016; Célérier & Cuenca Botey, 2015). These studies have revealed the 
actual motives and outcomes of PB, but left other aspects of the PB development apart from 
political ones uncovered. Yet other papers have deployed the structural perspective (e.g. social 
capital theory and institutional logics) in order to reflect on contestability of heteregoneous 
discources on PB (Nyamori et al., 2012; He, 2011) but hardly touched on the processes underlying 
the PB construction in practice. When it comes to the public administration and political 
literature, with a very few exceptions, studies seem to be rather undertheorized in relation to the 
problematic nature of PB and underlying processes behind that (Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012; 
Gusmano, 2013; Michels, 2011; Michels & De Graaf, 2010; Sintomer et al., 2012; Hong, 2015; 
Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Wamper and Hartz-Karp, 2012). This might be the case for an 
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explanation of politically and centrally driven PB stories, where PB is seen via projections of 
outcomes rather than premise processes, therefore leaving the micro-dynamics silent.  
That said, a growing number of studies encourages research that addresses the micro-details of 
PB design and mobilization (Musso et al., 2011), as well as their interaction with the local context 
(van Helden & Uddin, 2016). In this regard, some recent research efforts have been made to 
examine the dynamics of PB within a local context through emphasizing citizenry’ and authorities’ 
perceptions of PB and related actions. To illustrate, Uddin et al. (2017) argue that PB potential 
should be considered in terms of a particular cultural context. For Velinov & Kuruppu (2016),  the 
PB design at a local setting is a result of a diffusion process. What is more, Aleksandrov et al. 
(2018) look at the development of PB as an institutionalization process of dialogic accounting 
with emphasis on the importance of actors reflexivity toward PB. Yet other studies have 
addressed the issue of plural perceptions of PB by potential actors involved and how they should 
be mobilized in particular settings (Barbera et al., 2016; Flinders & Dommett, 2013).  
Despite the fact that cultural, diffusion and institutional reasons are vital in an understanding of 
the development of PB democratic values, some more recent studies have appealed to address 
the role of non-human dimension in advancing democratic developments within specific settings 
(e.g. Johnson, 2016; Barry, 2013; Marris, 2012). As one recent urban study has argued, “cities are 
learned and produced by planners through documents, by bureaucrats through regulations, by 
businessmen through economic reports and so on” (Sepúlveda, 2017, p. 157). In a similar way, 
accounting studies have emphasized that the bureaucratic machinery with its laws, decrees, 
related calculations, tables etc. play valuable roles in materialization of government actions in 
practice (Czarniawska, 2010). All this makes it necessary to address the role of non-human 
dimension while exploring democratic developments and related tools that are designed to foster 
democracy. And this becomes even more important under conditions of acute tension between 
democratic idea(l)s, the bureaucratic and, more recently, managerial nature of the public sector 
(Ariely, 2013; Im et al., 2014; Nabatchi, 2010; Neshkova, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, no 
studies have, until now, empirically addressed the issue of how PB has articulated within these 
discourses incorporating both human and non-human actors. In this regard, we search for some 
novel insights from actor-network theory.  
Actor-network theory and its application to PB 
Actor-network theory (ANT) has been increasingly applied in accounting studies (Modell et al., 
2017). The core benefit of its use in comparison with other accounting theories in general and in 
the case of PB in particular is that it directly stresses the role of both human and non-human 
actors embedded in the development, spread and acceptance of accounting innovations (Latour, 
1987, 2005). According to this view, the development of innovations should not be seen as a 
diffusion of elements but rather as a translation, that is, a process of aligning the diverse 
interests, claims, ideas and intentions of various human and non-human actors. In other words, 
translation is a process where a new traceable association (i.e. network) between human and 
non-human actors is produced, and through which an entity emerges and acquires its 
characteristics (Latour, 2005). Hence, with regard to design and mobilization of PB in particular 
settings, the original democratic values will, via the process of translation, be inevitably 
transformed, leaving some components and editing others. Consequently, “[W]e observe a 
process of translation – not one of reception, rejection, resistance, or acceptance” (Latour, 1994, 
p. 116) but rather of “displacement, drift, invention, mediation, creation of a new link that did 
not exist before…” (p. 6). From this perspective, such initiatives as PB are depicted not merely as 
a result of planned effort but also of random events with an unpredictable trajectory. Indeed, as 
the PB literature demonstrates, any attempt at a planned change never succeeds in full, thus 
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triggering a series of surprises (e.g. Ahrens & Ferry, 2015; Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Kuruppu et 
al., 2016). Such projections warrant that even carefully orchestrated changes are unlikely to avoid 
surprises and/or unintended effects, owing partly to alliances that varied actors forge along the 
way and political games that are played out (Mouritsen, 2005).  
As the previous research has manifested, there are various conceptual interpretations of 
translation and its use in the management literature in general (for review see Wæraas & 
Nielsen, 2016) and the accounting literature in particular (for review see Justesen & Mouritsen, 
2011; Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). These interpretations have led researchers to an “easy to get lost in 
theory” situation. Indeed, in assiduous endeavors to describe everything (meaning nothing?) as 
important, they (researchers) often found themselves in a situation of “not seeing the forest 
behind the trees” (Modell et al., 2017). To avoid this, Lukka and Vinnari’s (2014) advice is 
followed in this study, enabling to mobilize only parts/particular concepts which would be 
valuable for an extension of the PB literature. Specifically, the process of PB translation, with its 
emphasis on allies and inscriptions’ roles in the formation of networks, is examined. 
According to ANT, the fabrication of nascent PB ideas in Russia inevitably implies the need to 
align initiators’ interests with other existing discourses and actors’ interests within the Russian 
public sector. Based on the previous studies of translation, novel accounting initiatives, such as 
PB, would not be the product of the pre-existing social order but rather emerge from a lengthy 
and complex process of association. Throughout this process, the initiated characteristics (e.g. PB 
democractic values) may be ‘detoured’ as a scientist (in our case, the research group) endeavors 
to gain acceptance and convince others to accept these initiatives (Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2010). In 
this context, it is important to look for ‘allies’/alliances if a particular initiative is to succeed in a 
specific setting (Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2010; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011). When such initial allies 
are formed, various rhetorical/purification strategies tend to emerge in order to persuade, enroll 
further actors, and overcome any resistance (Arnaboldi & Palermo, 2011; Justesen & Mouritsen, 
2011). For example, Mennicken (2008) shows that, in order to succeed in Russia, Western 
accounting concepts should be inextricably linked with local/domestic ideas, concerns, discourses 
and mobilized with the support of powerful allies/networks. While such an approach witnessed  a 
growing demand in the management accounting studies (Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015; Wæraas & 
Nielsen, 2016), only a few efforts have been made to trace how this happens with regard to the 
PB literature, especially when the PB initiative is not a centrally driven practice. In fact, while the 
significant role of international organizations and consultant groups in the global development of 
PB is emphasized (Goldfrank, 2012), it remains rather unclear what diverse actors do regarding 
the materialization of PB on the ground, as well as consequences of new allies’ involvement.  
That emphasized, it is intellectually rewarding to examine what kinds of actors/allies have been 
involved in the fabrication of PB over time, and how they have impacted the formation of PB 
democratic values.      
Furthermore, the translation process as a constant network formation is not solely circumscribed 
by human actors. As the increasing number of studies have documented, accounting inventions 
require various artifacts/inscriptions, which become essential elements in the construction of 
networks (Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011; Modell et al., 2017; Qu & Cooper, 
2011). According to Latour (1987), inscriptions encompass any set-up, irrespective of the size, 
nature and cost, that provides a visual display of any sort, e.g. image, number or text. The 
set/cascade of inscriptions is as varied as diagrams, presentations, digital videos, accounting 
documents, instructions, regulation, manuals, conference/scientific papers, reports (Ezzamel & 
Xiao, 2015) and even meeting minutes or flipcharts (Qu & Cooper, 2011).  
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As the literature suggests, inscriptions are interesting not only because of their content but 
because of the action they enable by being material, mobile and combinable (Justesen & 
Mouritsen, 2011). Being incomplete representations, they rather serve as allies in building the 
arguments for new practice “purification”, acceptance and, therefore, making the mobilization of 
new accounting methods possible and providing the means for their mobilization and use in 
specific settings (Busco & Quattrone, 2015; Christensen & Skærbæk, 2010). With strong rhetorical 
power, they help to package them in an acceptable way to actors without necessarily changing 
the internal meanings but leading to network expansion (Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015). Furthermore, 
inscriptions can play a significant role in stabilizing divergent discourses (Qu & Cooper, 2011). 
With regard to PB’s case, inscriptions may be valuable for explaining the problems of bridging 
democratic, bureaucratic and managerialism discourses (Ariely, 2013; Im et al., 2014; Nabatchi, 
2010; Neshkova, 2014), as well as linking diverse actors, such as the citizenry and authorities, 
which are usually seen as problematic (Fung, 2015). Notwithstanding the rhetorical and 
mediation potential of inscriptions, they are often unstable and fragile. Moreover, their power is 
considerably influenced by inscriptors (‘spokesmen’) and the context in which they are set 
(Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015; Mennicken, 2008; Qu & Cooper, 2011). Regarding PB, one can witness 
situations where inscriptions can help overshadow the interests of one group of actors over 
another, or where the stability of inscriptions can be challenged by users’ use of previous 
inscriptions (Qu & Cooper, 2011). Thus, the translation process, besides the formation of allies, 
represents a continuous inscription-building process, where one set of inscriptions supersedes 
another (Qu & Cooper, 2011). Noteworthy, no research has so far empirically addressed the role 
of inscriptions in the PB literature generally and in proliferating its democratic values particularly. 
That is why it is promising to explore what kinds of inscriptions have been mobilized in the 
fabrication of PB over time and how they have impacted the formation of PB democratic values. 
Summing up the discussion, the adoption of PB is intended to trace the development of PB within 
the Russian setting as an intricate process of network formation, where many types of human 
actors (that is, inscriptors) and non-human actors (that is, inscriptions) are involved and who 
potentially influence democratic values construction.  
 
Method  
The empirical evidence presented in this study was based on triangulation of document analysis, 
observations, and in-depth interviews, covering the period from January 2013 until May 2017. 
Initially, the documentary analysis was crucial in studying the translation of PB. Elements of so-
called “slowciology” were widely adopted, founded on methodological slogans, such as “go 
slow”, “don’t jump” and “keep everything flat” (Latour, 2005), where a careful consideration of 
empirics with regard to the phenomenon in focus was emphasized (Qu & Cooper, 2011). To 
comprehend the translation of PB, we strove to do as Latour (1987) admonished and arrived 
before PB was fully fixed, known, and unproblematic. It is in this spirit and by using a 
“slowciology” approach (Latour, 2005), we captured the multiplicity of human actors, “allies” and 
inscriptions that became attached to PB as it had moved from the initial actors to the selected 
Russian municipality and then to the federal government. 
To begin with, we examined various texts and visual displays of any sort as significant elements in 
“slowciology” (Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015). Among these were the official texts of relevant Russian 
laws, budget messages, concept papers, municipal decrees, policy documents, methodological 
guidelines and recommendations. Moreover, the texts/visual displays of the Russian-language 
press/mass media were traced, along with Russian research publications and conference 
presentations related to the chosen case. Finally, various internal PB documents were assessed, 
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including the PB experiment’s initial description, PB guidelines, reports, participation protocols, 
various presentations and other texts advised by our respondents or considered valuable based 
on observations. Both internal documents and observations were available from a special online 
group created in the social networking service, VKontakte (the Russian equivalent of Facebook) 
[hereafter, the online group]. 
Next, several types of observations were conducted. Firstly, video footage of the PB meetings and 
other related events, dating from April 2013, was available from the online group’s storage box. 
Access to these video-materials was granted when one author joined the online group in 2013. 
This allowed us to begin practicing so-called netnographic observations, when the authors 
observed not only physical interaction between people but also ‘what they do online’ in relation 
to PB: what people discuss online, what they upload, what they comment on/criticize and how 
these observations relate to video footage, documents analyzed and interviews. Additionally, the 
data was extended by analyzing external video footage of PB researchers’ presentations at 
Russian scientific and ministerial conferences.  
Furthermore, 16 semi-structured interviews were conducted with all sets of participants involved 
in the PB process within the municipality, made up of two local executive officers, the citizenry 
(12 participants), and two PB researchers. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face and a 
few via Skype to save costs. Almost all face-to-face interviews took place within the municipality 
during September 2015. Snowball sampling was largely used to trace informants, with 
interviewees’ references for new respondents considered. However, documentary analysis and 
observations were also used to create the preliminary picture of various actors’ roles, prior to 
interviewing. This helped us approach divergent actors and speak more freely, having some 
understanding of ‘what the story looked like’ before obtaining deeper personal reflections from 
interviewees. The duration of interviews and the number of questions varied considerably from 
one informant to another, each interview lasting around one to two hours on average. 
Nevertheless, the common strategy was to extend our understanding from the documentary 
analysis and observations. Interviews included, but were not limited to, open-ended questions, 
such as why and how respondents began to participate, how the process was progressing, and 
what their role was, what challenges they faced and how they coped with them, what PB gave 
them personally. All face-to-face interviews were audiotaped, with informants’ permission. As 
soon as possible after each interview, we listened to the recording and made notes. The 
interview summaries and resultant transcripts were dispatched to respondents for further 
elaboration on the discussed topics.  
The data analysis strategy was primarily based on creating a ‘holistic picture’, describing the 
development of PB in a chronological order and tracking various explanations via actor-network 
theory. Interview transcripts, documents and notes were highlighted and coded according to the 
fields of study interests, i.e. actors, ‘allies’ and inscriptions. In doing so, the ‘holistic picture’ was 
further narrowed to capture the key themes and explanations. We circled back and forth 
between our core themes discovered and explanations until theoretical saturation was reached. 
Keywords, phrases, and statements were marked to allow the voices of the major players of the 
PB experiment – the citizenry, public officials, and academics – to speak.  
 
Empirical background   
The empirical data for this paper was based on a case study conducted in one Russian 
municipality.    The selected municipality is located in the northwestern part of the country, with 
around 60–70,000 inhabitants. The administrative structure of the municipality is composed of 
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three major elements: the representative (legislative) council, the head of the municipality (the 
Mayor), and the local administration (the executive body). The representative council consists of 
twenty deputies, all of whom are directly elected by local residents for a five-year term. Among 
other prerogatives and mandates, this body approves the local budget and the report on its 
implementation, is in charge of the budgetary control, introduces local taxes and fees, adopts 
plans and programs for the development of the municipality, to mention a few. The Mayor is the 
highest official within the jurisdiction of the municipality. He is elected by the representative 
council among its members. His term of office is similar to that of the municipal deputies. The 
Mayor has several obligations: e.g. to represent the municipality, to issue legal acts within the 
limits of his authority.  
The local administration represents an executive body. It is headed by a manager who is hired by 
the representative council of the municipality on a contractual basis for a five-year term of office. 
The organizational structure of the local executive is divided into several 
committees/departments. These committees/departments include: Finance; Education; Social 
Welfare; Municipal Property Management; Architecture, Town Planning and Land Use; and 
Housing and Utilities Management. According to the current legislation, the local executive is 
accountable for its actions and decisions to the local legislature. However, the reality is that the 
local administration continues to dominate the decision-making process in general and budgeting 
in particular within the selected municipality. It should be noted here that such practices are 
common in many municipalities across the country (Klimanov and Mikhaillova, 2011). This is 
partly due to the fact that supervisory powers of the legislature are often restricted and that 
many regulatory functions are de facto in the hands of the local executive.       
The annual budget of the municipality for 2013-2017 varied from $40 million to $65 million, and 
were almost all the time balanced without any borrowings. The revenues of the municipal budget 
are formed primarily by own tax and non-tax revenues, with the major tax contributing to the 
budget revenues being personal income tax (about 61.0% share in the aggregate revenues). 
Under the law in force, the local expenditures are allocated on the basis of so-called 
“programme-based budgeting”, and comprise medical treatment and education, development 
and maintenance of social and transport infrastructure, transport services, waste management, 
to mention some.   
The budgeting process within the selected municipality is as follows. Proposals for drafting the 
budget are done by the local executive, commencing from sprin  each year. These proposals are 
based on socio-economic development forecasts for the municipality and priorities set by 
annually reviewed programs. Despite the principle of local autonomy for the municipality from 
regional and federal governments determined by the law, the programs' priorities and budgets 
are heavily controlled by and largely comply with federal and regional priorities which are 
referred to as “power vertical”. This, in turn, has direct repercussions on the role of the local 
representative (legislative) council that plays a rather ceremonial role in municipal affairs. 
Noteworthy, this situation is widespread in many Russian municipalities (Klimanov, and 
Mikhailova, 2016). Not surprisingly and with regard to the budgeting process within the selected 
municipality, the local legislature approves the budget set by the executive somewhere in 
November-December each year, without any significant amendments. Notwithstanding the fact 
that local regulations de jure include public participation in the decision-making processes 
regarding governance and budget, this possibility is de facto limited to the participation in so-
called public hearings occurring at the end of each year, when the budget has already been 
drafted and agreed with upper level bodies of the executive authorities (Klimanov, and 
Mikhailova, 2016). 
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The municipality examined in this paper was among the pioneers in Russia1 to embark on this 
journey towards PB since 2013. Rather a rare case in contemporary Russia, the launch of PB 
caused a stir in the mass media, with colorful, punchy headlines like “Local democracy is feasible” 
abounding in newspapers and on Internet sites in 2013. Such a case attracted our attention and 
motivated our PB investigation.  
 
Empirical findings 
Phase 1. Initial fabrication of PB: is an idea which is merely good (but alien) not enough? 
The PB initiative did not originate in the municipality. It came to the attention of the local 
executive authorities via a small research group affiliated to a leading Russian academic 
institution in the humanities and social sciences field. The point of departure here was the 
mixture of several interrelated factors motivating the research group’s members to develop PB. 
Firstly, the general research interests of the group’s members in relation to the problems of 
communication between the citizenry and municipal authorities made them search for a possible 
solution. Another motivational factor was linked to “democracy crisis” (Fung, 2015) in Russia, 
where “Citizens/constituencies have to a large extent ignored the voting process [as they mistrust 
government]” (research group member). This mixture of factors gave birth to PB, with its pledge 
to enhance communication and democratic governance, as a possible solution. As one research 
group member emphasized: “It was the right place and time to apply PB”.  
As suggested by translation literature (Latour, 1987), however, new ideas are not so easy to 
fabricate, especially in an alien context, even though they seem to be demanded. In the selected 
municipality, the initial PB fabrication commenced with a set of interpretations from scientific 
sources such as Sintomer et al. (2008) in 2012. After conducting several internal university 
workshops, the research group prepared the first set of inscriptions related to PB and its possible 
application on Russian ‘soil’. More precisely, the first set of manuals was issued, describing the 
background of PB (Porto Allegro, 1989), its democratization and communication potential, 
examples of good practice (Europe, Brazil and the US), as well as its possible implications for the 
Russian context.  
However, the alien nature of PB inevitably led to aligning initiators’ interests with other existing 
discourses and powerful actors’ interests as a quest for allies in an attempt to succeed (Arnaboldi 
& Azzone, 2010; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011). In this quest, a new set of inscriptions (PB project 
application) was constructed, with PB ideas problematized around highly demanded discourses of 
transparency and efficiency. These discourses have been on top of the agenda in Russia over 
recent years. The federal authorities enacted several federal laws, introducing updated 
requirements for budgetary information disclosure2 and new performance accountability and 
budgeting mechanisms (for overview, see Khodachek & Timoshenko, 2017). More importantly, 
the PB idea was not only inextricably aligned with these discourses but also 
problematized/described as an alternative and more efficient mechanism, compared with 
existing practices in the public sector. For the sake of illustration, the research group criticized a 
traditional way of disclosing “transparent information”, favoring PB as a tool where “Citizens use 
[that] information in order to interact with authorities and forming, thereby, the efficient 
democratic governance mechanism” (PB project application document).  
                                                            
1
 To the best of our knowledge, several attempts to initiate some participatory mechanisms were previously made in Russian municipalities, such 
as budget roundtables, at which specific issues were debated by expert members of civil society and municipalities. Moreover, similar local 
initiative programs were sponsored and delivered by the World Bank on a regional level during 2009–2013 (World Bank, 2014). There was, 
however, no experience of direct participation by the citizenry in the allocation of budget expenditure until recently.  
2
 Federal Law “On providing access to information on the activities of state bodies and bodies of local self-government”, 2009. 
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Due to the coherent alignment of PB with wider domestic discourses and its innovativeness, the 
research group received financial support from a powerful Russian non-governmental foundation 
to experiment with PB. This foundation is widely known in Russia for its neoliberal ideas of public 
sector modernization by supporting an independent judicial system, transparency, efficiency and 
civil expertise initiatives. In the PB case, financial support was provided as part of a larger project 
calibrated to enhance budget transparency in Russia and covered the experiment’s operating 
expenses. The implication for such support was a set of requirements regarding deadlines and 
deliverables of what was further called a “PB project”. The final inscription (PB project document) 
presented PB as a tool for an “efficiency and transparency boost”, while relegating the 
democratic goals of PB. How the PB experiment was forced within the selected municipality, via 
new inscription building for network expansion, is discussed below. 
Phase 2. Forcing the PB experiment within the municipality: all should benefit somehow, but at 
what price? 
The point of departure was to search for municipalities capable of experimenting with PB. 
Alongside inscriptions’ significance for a success, the general strategy of the research group was 
to select and offer the PB experiment to those municipalities that “can and are ready to 
experiment with their own resources” (research group member). Indeed, most Russian 
municipalities were suffering from fiscal crises and were therefore not suitable for a successful 
experimentation involving mechanisms such as PB (World Bank, 2014). With only a few 
municipalities meeting such criteria, the research group’s choice fell on the selected municipality 
as one setting for the experiment. This municipality was known for its sound fiscal performance 
(the balanced budget), and the effective system of governance3.  
When it comes to an initial contact for the experiment request, as both research group members 
and administration officials reflected on, there were no problems with the PB project document, 
since it fitted squarely with the current municipal agenda, aiming to augment efficiency and 
transparency. Therefore, new allies (that is, the municipal administration) were formed for 
further PB translation. Nevertheless, as observed during phase 1, such new allies led to new 
inscription building, downgrading the initial proposition of PB as a democratic accountability tool. 
The further inscription-building process in the PB design was strictly confined to formal 
bureaucratic mechanisms, existing local inscriptions (local administration orders, programs, 
degrees, regalements), and even NPM elements (program budgeting). For example, in order to 
launch the PB experiment, a special responsible committee was created and a specific roadmap 
was issued. This roadmap prescribed particular stages of the experiment, with the corresponding 
deadlines, responsible person(s), and how this roadmap was cohere t with local legislation and 
the municipality’s responsibilities. Another example is the symbolic sum of budget expenditure 
(around 1%) available for the citizens’ decision. This was justified by one local executive as 
constraints where all budget expenditures were based on a program principle. As a result, a new 
set of inscriptions was built, including but not limited to, a detailed PB experiment roadmap, the 
order on the special responsible committee, ‘PB regalement’
4
 and protocols. 
The final roadmap (PB design) was jointly prepared by the local executive (represented by the 
municipal finance committee) and research group members to pave the way for PB. The need for 
“developing a tool for citizen involvement throughout the budgetary process, as well as 
                                                            
3
 This is based on the Russian Federal Ministry’s of Finance Report (2013) that ranked the municipalities on the basis 
of a bunch of qualitative and quantitative characteristics, including fiscal sustainability, a citizens’ survey regarding 
the level of satisfaction of local authorities functioning, transparency initiatives, and municipalities’ participation in 
regional and national programs, to name a few.   
4
 By ‘regalement’ we refer to a document that prescribes a procedural framework for PB meetings. 
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enhancing the efficiency of communication between the citizenry and public officials” (Municipal 
decree, 2013) was proclaimed a key objective. Regarding the regulations laid down in the 
aforementioned municipal decree, public participation in the PB process was mandatory. For that 
purpose, a special PB committee, consisting of 15 inhabitants, was formed via an annual lottery. 
Fifteen other citizens were ready to serve as substitutes in case any participant withdraw. The PB 
committee members were not allowed to hold positions as either deputies of the legislative 
council or representatives of the local executive. In addition, one research group member was 
appointed to moderate the public meetings and to ensure the voices (concerns) of the 
participants were heard. Committee members were empowered, among other things, to submit 
ideas and proposals for projects for inclusion in the PB budget, to debate the projects submitted, 
and to vote on shortlisted proposals. However, they were not allowed to decide on the 
procedural framework of the PB process itself. That said, a special effort was to be directed by 
the local executive towards providing participants with information on the PB process’ key stages, 
time schedule, how to submit proposals and how to vote, to mention just a few. 
It was anticipated that such a weak form of participation within the procedural rules would give 
rise to many questions from potential participants, i.e. the citizens. Nevertheless, the further 
characteristics of a new set of inscriptions made such justifications possible, thereby convincing 
the citizenry to participate in the PB experiment. Firstly, various inscriptions were mobilized by 
the administrative officials and research group members via a local mass-media PR campaign: e.g. 
interviews and articles about PB in local newspapers and on TV. In the mass media, the PB 
experiment was widely promoted as a combined effort by the municipality, the university, and 
the foundation, therefore gaining high credibility in citizens’ eyes. Interestingly, more democratic 
rhetoric was mobilized at this stage, providing examples of democratic improvements in Brazil, 
the US and Europe in the aftermath of the PB launch and how this democratic innovation could 
be applied in Russia, as citizens can “directly participate in the allocation of budgetary resources” 
(Local Newspaper, 2013). 
Secondly, following this PR campaign, a special meeting was organized, at which citizens were 
largely convinced regarding the appropriateness of using PB. This was done by a power-point 
presentation by the organizers. Not only inscriptions themselves played a significant role at this 
meeting but also those presenting PB inscriptions, namely, research group members and 
municipal executives. For example, the random selection, the limited number of participants (15) 
and limited budget amount (1%) were justified by including examples of good practice from other 
PB countries, alongside the experimental nature of PB.  
Nevertheless, not all citizens attending the meeting were fully convinced by the PB rhetoric and 
its implications for Russia. It is therefore not surprising that only around 90 inhabitants out of 
140, who had expressed initial interest, applied for PB. As a result, the special PB committee (15 
members) and substitutes (15 citizens) were randomly selected to provide a mini-public, which 
started operating in spring 2013. 
Phase 3. PB experimenting “in the hands of others”: democracy, bureaucracy, and NPM - 
encounter or interaction? 
The first year (2013) of the PB experiment appeared to be the most problematic in putting “the 
citizenry, the local executive, and the academics together at one table”, where generated “ideas 
of the PB Commission were stalling” (Local Newspaper, 2013). When the PB committee 
commenced work, the number of inscriptions at play rose dramatically. The PB roadmap, 
‘regalement’ and protocols arguably became not the only ones supposed to mediate the citizens 
and administration. 
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After the first PB committee meeting, the online (social networking) group was created. This 
group not only became a sort of information platform, where official inscriptions (e.g. roadmap) 
were supposed to be uploaded; more importantly, it gave rise to other inscriptions that were not 
easily controlled by the organizers. Among other things, this included new links about 
experiences of the PB process, forum lines/topics discussed by PB participants and other citizens, 
since the group was open to all. While the online group and its inscriptions were initially not in 
high demand, the situation began to alter when several problems in the development of the PB 
experiment were observed. 
The first problem concerned the general constraints set by the roadmap, ‘regalement’ and 
protocols on the deliberation potential of PB. The participants e.g. reflected on a lack of time to 
understand how the PB system should operate and what budgeting decisions they could develop. 
As our respondents revealed, they were constantly under pressure to go further with the 
roadmap. This led to a general lack of fruitful/constructive discussions and deliberation which 
“were usually framed by our experts [the research group], who kept saying that we should 
develop project ideas for budget application as soon as possible” (PB participant, 2013). The 
same issue concerned ‘regalement’ and protocols during PB commission meetings. As some 
respondents argued, even when one commission member presented his interesting ideas, no 
further discussion occurred. Such observations can be justified by a strong need to moderate the 
meetings, as “Citizens are not used to negotiating with and listening to each other” (research 
group member). Thus, the activities and deliberation of the PB committee were symbolic, with 
procedural/mechanistic action in developing budget application ideas “partly framed by 
themselves, partly by experts and partly by weak discussions” (PB participant, 2013).  
Consequently, most ideas concerned capital budgeting (e.g. reconstruction of the stadium, cycle 
lanes or the creation of public zones). 
However, although ideas were constructed, they had to be further checked and developed by the 
municipal authorities, eventually giving rise to other constraints in the PB experiment. 
Communication/interaction between the PB committee and various municipal committees/ 
departments was observed to be weak. In fact, communication between the PB committee and 
local administration was also set via inscriptions. Specifically, so-called “project applications” 
were developed by each PB participant, with such internal items as “goal, relevance, action plan, 
outcome and preliminary budget”. However, when these “project applications”, also known as 
official requests, were first sent to the administration and then to the corresponding municipal 
committee/department, several encounters emerged regarding their improvements/alignment. 
For example, as some executives revealed, due to weak competencies, the PB committee’s ideas, 
though interesting, often lacked an understanding of “municipal realities” and the complex 
bureaucratic procedures arising from each initiative. The same applied to some “project 
requests”, requiring the involvement of several departments or even regional authorities at the 
implementation stage, meaning that the responsibility should be shared and the initiative could 
be too complex and costly. Consequently, the PB committee sent official response letters for each 
initiative with specific justifications (usually in technical language) and referred to specific 
normative documents (e.g. laws, decrees, standards, normative acts) or showed that a similar 
initiative was already underway or planned. Another example concerns how various municipal 
departments perceived the PB initiatives themselves. As some executives reflected on, they were 
primarily inclined to associate PB with elements of the NPM “efficiency boost”. Therefore, they 
viewed PB suggested initiatives via the prism of existing program priorities and searched for ways 
of fulfilling planned performance indicators with the use of PB. Such a perception eventually 
resulted in what PB participants called “managing and manipulation tricks”, when, in official 
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responses, the municipal departments suggested adjusting the initiative, referring to particular 
normative documents; in reality, however, leading to a specific indicator fulfillment. 
Therefore, bureaucracy and even some elements of NPM (seeking to fulfil indicators) were 
observed at this phase of the experiment, despite the fact that PB was originally expected to 
replace them. In this way, PB was translated into a sort of co-creation mechanism, with a limited 
number of citizens being involved in highly constrained initiatives. While the above-mentioned 
examples characterize the encounter of PB with these elements, this also reinforced further 
inscription building related to moving this encounter into interaction. Specifically, lectures, 
presentations, and learning workshops were arranged by research group members, where some 
municipal department representatives could also participate/deliver lectures. For example, 
lectures with PowerPoint presentations were organized on such topics as a budgetary process 
within the municipality (by the municipal budget department head), urban planning (by the 
university lecturer), and public procurement (the municipality procurement department officer). 
In some sense, these new inscriptions became the only ones that bridged the discourses of the 
citizenry and municipal departments. Noteworthy, all those events were video-recorded and 
uploaded into the social network. Having become publicly available, they acquired a status of 
open inscriptions, fostering thereby new actions.   
All the above-mentioned inscriptions (including video footage of lectures and meetings) were 
uploaded on the online group. That sparked further discussions online, generating a kind of 
collective learning. For illustration, the budgeting process lecture generated additional 
discussions about the budgetary process, and additional materials or links about particular issues 
were uploaded after this. Another example showed that some official responses, which were 
uploaded on the online group, sparked off criticism among those citizens familiar with the 
specifics of the technical process. Such additional discussions led to an extra administrative 
burden, while justifying a rejection of some initiatives.  
However, the first year of the PB experiment did not fully reveal a potential for such an 
uncontrolled inscription-building process online and its learning potential. As our observation 
revealed, only a few projects ended up with voting. As a result, in autumn 2013, two capital 
construction projects were brought to a successful conclusion in the selected municipality for 
2014: a cycle park and a playground worth around 1.1 % of the municipal budget. As far as early 
PB outcomes were concerned, all parties embedded in the experiment seemed satisfied. This was 
reflected in several new inscriptions (newspaper articles, TV interviews with organizers, 
participants and administration) within local mass media that propagated the successful rhetoric 
of PB, e.g. “Democracy and communication are possible”, “Citizens and authorities can 
cooperate, and we know how”.  
Phase 4. Opening up PB potential via previous inscriptions: “Pandora’s box” for administration? 
After the propagandized success of PB, new PB cycles were launched (2014 and 2015). It was 
decided to largely follow the same logic as that of the first year, where a new randomly selected 
PB commission had to spend 1% of the municipal budget. However, the way in which the 
citizenry, the PB commission and the administrative officers interacted began to alter, alongside 
the inscription building and new ‘uninvited’ allies.  
Specifically, we observed a situation in which the online group’s previous inscriptions (e.g. video 
footage of lectures and meetings) had led to a more constructive new inscription-building process 
by new PB commission members, therefore challenging initial PB constraints. Based on the 
previous years’ experience, commission members began to develop more constructive ideas 
(official requests), which were, from the outset, in line with a set of procedural, bureaucratic and 
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NPM constraints. For example, such innovations as consolidating projects into “calculation groups 
tables” (large, medium and small projects), special “guidelines for project development” and 
“main lessons from last year” brochures were applied. Such ‘good work’ by the PB commission 
led to an unexpectedly ‘hard workload’ for officials working with PB, with citizens starting to 
understand “how the municipal system works”. As one official stated, the development of PB 
over time could be compared with “Pandora’s box”, opened unintentionally:  
“You see, the first year was more like a little homework for me – I saw all their [PB commission 
members] scarcely possible ideas and tried to justify what was wrong with them. Now, it’s more 
complicated, since people propose many really valuable ideas, provide calculations and even 
suggest some co-funding sources. In this sense, this is like a Pandora’s box that we opened with all 
these lectures and PB in general. Now, it requires much more work for us to respond to all these 
requests, since they speak the same language as us.”   
Indeed, the interaction means between PB commission members and the authorities altered over 
the years, with more critical but constructive discourses appearing within the PB agenda and 
official responses. To illustrate, some official responses sparked off constructive criticism of the 
municipal department’s work in the area addressed within the initiatives. Such criticism forced 
the municipal departments to arrange additional meetings with the PB commission, aimed at 
discussing their initiatives (all those meeting were recorded, with the citizenry having direct 
online access to them). Interestingly, the online group came to be used more actively for 
presenting initiatives and discussing their development online. The situation became even more 
dramatic when the online group began to develop new online communities concerning particular 
initiatives and support from the citizenry via a description of the project, visualization and budget 
calculations (including possible sources of funding). As one respondent highlighted, under such 
circumstances, “Administration had to be very careful regarding what was written in official 
responses”. Moreover, although not all initiatives were put into the 1% of the municipal budget, 
the created discourses were not limited by that, rather leading to a general investigation of 
municipal deputies’ decisions. For example, the PB online group could lead to general scrutiny of 
the municipal authorities’ particular actions regarding budgeting decisions beyond the PB frame, 
e.g. questioning “why we need to spend 10 mln. on the reconstruction of park ‘X’ if it is well 
maintained” (PB commission member).   
However, inscriptions were not the only factor contributing to such “an opening of Pandora’s 
box” situation. As the literature suggests, how and what divergent actors/allies interact with 
inscriptions at a particular moment can also affect a new practice’s development (Qu & Cooper, 
2011). In PB’s case, the growing role of activists and NGOs members in PB participation was 
observed during 2014–2017. Consequently, the vast majority of newcomers to the PB 
commission constituted various activist groups and NGOs, despite random selection. As one 
participant confessed, this actually led to weak deliberation during PB meetings, where ready-
made projects were presented, leaving the chance for ordinary citizens (who also became PB 
commission members) to develop their own initiatives. The general logic for initiatives was to 
form allies among the members and decide what to do to develop the initiatives. In this sense, 
rather than empowering citizens to decide on public resource allocation, as was the case 
previously, PB became a tool for lobbying the interests of powerful activist groups and NGOs. 
That said, activist groups and NGOs turned out to become ‘uninvited’ and ‘unintended’ allies in 
the PB translation, forcing rather unusual but truthful critical scrutiny and inscription-building 
process. Wampler (2007) coined this phenomenon “process hijacking”, referring to situations in 
which PB was heavily controlled by active citizens to serve their own interests. Notably, it is 
rather difficult to argue whether this is a ‘bad thing’ or ‘good thing‘, and whether their interests 
are “vested” or not. As we have noted above, despite this “process hijacking” within the PB 
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commission throughout stage 4, the democratic values of PB were heightened via the ‘good 
work’ of inscription building by the online group and the PB commission. However, these 
practices did not last for a long time.   
 
 
Phase 5. The research group leaving the PB experiment: Rebalancing the citizenry interests with 
those of local elites   
Over the years of PB experiment in the selected municipality, the research group gradually 
became embedded into the promotion of PB in other Russian municipalities and regions. 
Precisely, the research group worked on PB with five municipalities in 2014 and nine in 2015. The 
expansion of PB experience and its promotion sparked a great interest in PB at federal level. Via 
promoting PB via external inscription building (e.g. publications in local, regional mass media, 
practice-oriented articles, conference presentations) and new experiments, the research group 
established contacts with new powerful allies, not only at the federal level (e.g. the Financial 
Research Institute under the Russian Ministry of Finance) but also with international partners 
(e.g. the World Bank Program on Local Initiatives Support). What is more, research group 
members were involved as experts at a newly established center responsible for developing 
democratic governance instruments in Russia5.  
Not surprisingly, the creation of the federal center resulted in novel responsibilities for the 
research group, eventually leading its members to distance themselves from the selected 
municipality. Having been primarily preoccupied with promoting PB in other municipalities, the 
research group minimized its role within the selected municipality to purely consultancy 
functions, and barely interacted with the local administration and PB participants. In this context, 
a local moderator was appointed. This contributed significantly to “process hijacking” when the 
local moderator was incapable of controlling fruitful discussions and scarcely represented the 
third/mediation side between the citizens and municipal authorities. Indeed, the general profile 
of moderators was such that they belonged to specific local activist groups, questioning therefore 
their impartiality.  
That emphasized, most respondents acknowledged the crucial role of the research group in 
lowering tensions between the executive and committee members, on the one hand, and among 
committee members themselves, on the other. As one committee member stated, 
“A lot, in fact, depended on the research group. This is because we were completely 
unaware of PB and its procedural framework. If the group representative did not attend the 
meetings, this could easily lead us to meaningless discussions, or even worse, publicly 
insulting each other”.   
Not surprisingly, despite paradoxical PB’s democratic boost illustrated by truthful critical scrutiny 
of local government budget decisions by the PB commission (phase 4), the credibility of PB 
internal process and local moderator  was severely criticized by other ordinary citizens and 
political leaders who stayed away PB until it began to create problems for them. As one 
participant (an activist group member) stressed,   
                                                            
5
 In 2015, the special center of initiative budgeting was established as a part of the Financial Research Institute at the Russian 
Ministry of Finance. The center was established through the cooperation of the World Bank Program and the Russian Ministry of 
Finance.  
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 “The way PB evolved actually started to challenge the work of our municipal deputies. I would 
even say that the PB commission started to do the same work as the municipal deputies. Then, 
why do we need them?” 
To cope effectively with actions orchestrated by ‘uninvited’ PB allies (that is, NGOs and activists), 
new constraints for the PB process were endorsed by the administration throughout 2016. More 
precisely, a new regalement came into force. It was prescribed that PB commission members’ 
ideas should go through an additional round of municipal council discussions, justifying this with 
the previous inscriptions. Specifically, our inquiry has manifested that it was very easy for the 
municipal administration to make access to video materials and meeting protocols through a 
direct link in order to show a lack of deliberation and moderator bias in PB cycles. That said, the 
resulting PB practice is in a state of flux, constantly changing in terms of rebalancing the interests 
of the citizenry with those of municipal elites. Municipal council members’ involvement in PB 
made the practice even more complex and sophisticated over time. 
In this regard, along with the municipal council round of PB initiatives’ evaluation, in 2017 the PB 
committee launched an online system of ranking various initiatives. While initiatives were 
developed by 15 PB commission members, who arguably represented ordinary citizens, other 
citizens could decide what is relevant or not.  Under these circumstances, “Not only municipal 
authorities should be careful in what they say about PB but also the municipal council” 
(moderator, PB online group forum, 2017). In this way, the constraints deliberately imposed by 
local elites actually resulted in heightened citizenry accountability through PB. It requires further 
investigation whether this will bring about the municipal authorities to open “the Pandora Box” 
even more.   
 
Discussion and analysis   
 
Having become recognized in the literature as a citizen-driven accountability tool, PB may foster 
key democratic governance values (Fung, 2015), including democratic legitimacy, effective 
governance and social justice. Such rhetoric was increasingly propagandized during the past 
decades, eventually leading to a consensual endorsement of PB worldwide (Célérier & Cuenca 
Botey, 2015). However, a growing number of research efforts have shown the problematic nature 
of the PB processes, its political aspects and unexpected outcomes (e.g. Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; 
Gusmano, 2013; He, 2011; Im et al., 2014; Kuruppu et al., 2016; Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012). At 
the same time, a few studies have so far addressed the micro-details of PB design and 
mobilization (Musso et al., 2011) and how they interact with the local context, local discourses 
and actors on the ground (van Helden & Uddin, 2016). As some recent studies have argued, such 
relationships may uncover a more nuanced/complex view on the issues of the democratization 
and mediation potential of tools such as PB that goes beyond traditionally revealed tensions and 
power struggles, in favor of inventing how PB innovations are articulated in local settings and 
what mechanisms are used to connect PB democratic promises with local specifics (Kornberger et 
al., 2017). As some more recent research has suggested, this may become even more intriguing if 
non-human actors and their role in enhancing democratic governance values are taken into 
account (e.g. Johnson, 2016; Barry, 2013; Marris, 2012; Sepúlveda, 2017) 
That said, an empirical narrative of how PB, as a democratic governance tool, has been translated 
within the public sector was brought to light in this paper. With the use of actor-network theory 
and its inherent concept of translation (Latour, 1987, 1994, 2005), the relational and rhetorical 
work of human (allies/inscriptors) and non-human (inscriptions) actors involved in the 
development of PB in Russia, was captured. In what follows, we present the key findings, based 
on our theoretical lenses, and elaborate on these findings in relation to the previous literature on 
PB.   
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Our empirical evidence demonstrates that, having emanated from a locally operating research 
group, the PB went through several phases of translation within the Russian public sector (see 
Table 1), where various forms of inscriptions and networks were formed, which, in turn, impacted   
the development of democratic governance values of PB over time.  
  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Firstly, in contrast with most recent studies, which examine centrally or politically driven PB 
developments (e.g. Harun et al., 2015; Kuruppu et al., 2016), we observe locally driven PB 
invention. Here, the initial fabrication of PB inevitably led to the need to align the interests of the 
research group (the main initiator) with other existing discourses and powerful actors’ interests 
within the Russian public sector. In this sense, through the initial set of inscriptions (see Phase 1 
in Table 1), the PB found its ‘allies’ in neoliberal groups (Foundation as a new ally) and fitted well 
with the discourses of transparency and efficiency circulating within the Russian public sector. 
This led to the first stage of the PB translation as initial allies were formed but democratic 
governance values were fogged with other important rhetorical/purification inscriptions’ points 
(transparency and efficiency) aimed at convincing new allies to embark on PB (Christensen & 
Skærbæk, 2010; Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015). In this sense, while our observation is in line with 
previous literature on administrative discourses (e.g. He, 2011; Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012), via 
translation literature, we stress that these discourses (in our case efficiency and transparency) 
inevitably become essential parts of PB under the quest for new democratic innovation to 
succeed (Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2010; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011; Mennicken, 2008). Reflecting 
on PB democratic values (Fung, 2015), we argue that, even during the initial phase of the PB 
development in a new country context, the democratic legitimacy and effective governance can 
be easily blended with agendas of efficiency a d central government legitimacy.  
To secure both the citizenry and municipality administration involvement during phase 2 (see 
Table 1), a new set of inscriptions (presentations and a project document) became a powerful 
instrument in the research group’s hands. As the literature suggests, inscriptions can mobilize 
different purification points for divergent actors since they are incomplete representations 
(Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015; Qu & Cooper, 2011). This quality of inscriptions is known as scalability or 
modifiability (Latour, 1987), when the PB would be packaged in a way that would be accepted by 
new actors (municipalities in our case) but not necessarily alter internal propositions. The 
empirical evidence gathered in this paper shows that, via a series of inscriptions, PB translation 
was centered around several discourses such as efficiency and transparency (for the municipal 
authorities) and democracy (for the citizenry). As the literature suggests, inscriptions can help 
stabilize these divergent discourses (Qu & Cooper, 2011). On the other hand, inscriptions can also 
help overshadow the interests of one group over another in order to succeed with a new 
practice’s development (Ezzamel & Xiao, 2015; Qu & Cooper, 2011).  
A dual nature of inscriptions was observed in our case. Firstly, the PB development and its 
underlying inscription-building process within the selected municipality was inextricably linked 
with bureaucracy (e.g. orders, statutes, degrees) and even NPM inscriptions (budget programs’ 
priorities and a search for efficiency under central government pressure), which in turn led to 
further downplaying the democratic governance values of PB. Secondly, this downplay was 
fogged by the rhetorical power of inscriptions and good ‘spokesmen’ (research group members), 
thereby overcoming some citizens’ skepticism and persuading them to join the experiment.  
Although providing incomplete pictures, the PB inscriptions played a vital role in making local 
actors accept PB. In this regard, our observations challenge previous literature presentations of 
tensions between democratic, bureaucratic and NPM ideologies throughout PB implementation 
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(Ariely, 2013; Im et al., 2014; Nabatchi, 2010; Neshkova, 2014; Nyamori et al., 2012). We argue 
that, without bureaucratic and NPM allies, the further potentially surprising translation of PB was 
not possible in our case. All in all, we observed during phase 2 that new allies (that is, the local 
administration and the citizenry) and inscriptions led to similar fogging of PB democratic values, 
but more democratic rhetoric was mobilized.  
As Kornberger et al. (2017) stated, the introduction of novel democratic tools into government 
should not be viewed as only an encounter with existing practices but rather as a more complex 
interaction process. Via actor-network theory, we searched for such kinds of interactions, as the 
PB experiment was put on the stage, where many actors became involved. According to Latour 
(1987), under these circumstances, the translation of PB would hardly be controlled by initial 
actors, putting it “in the hands of others”. Such observations were intensified throughout phase 3 
(see Table 1), as the number of inscriptions and actors/allies increased (e.g. various 
administration departments). That said, several examples of encounters and interactions 
between divergent actors were presented.  For example, such inscriptions as official timetable 
and ‘regalement’ were installed as part of local government bureaucratic procedures. The 
communication between the citizenry involved in PB and the administration was also set via 
inscriptions (e.g. requests, official responses). Consequently, citizen involvement was highly 
framed (but not only limited) by strict bureaucratic procedures. In this context, citizens’ initiatives 
were also circumscribed by administration departments’ existing accountability mechanisms 
regarding NPM tools (e.g. searching for particular indicators’ fulfillment through citizens’ 
initiatives). The language of such inscriptions was barely understandable to the citizenry, 
characterizing bureaucratic means taking over (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004) and challenging 
participants’ education and expertise (Hong, 2015; Neshkova, 2014). Despite the positive 
democratic rhetoric, PB played only a symbolic role in this phase, where citizens’ initiatives were 
highly constrained but well justified by the organizers via inscriptions. In this way, PB was 
translated into a sort of co-creation mechanism, where a limited number of citizens were 
involved in highly constrained initiatives (Barbera et al., 2016) and where the initial democratic 
enthusiasm for PB faded away (Fung, 2015). These observations accord with the previous 
literature, which stresses the symbolic nature of PB (Adams, 2004; Im et al., 2014) and 
technocrats’ domination (Gusmano, 2013; Michels, 2011; Michels & De Graaf, 2010).  
However, perhaps more interestingly, such complex translation led to a new inscriptions’ 
formation that endeavored to ‘purificate’ problems or lead to their solution. This fits well with 
the inscription literature that argues that some past inscriptions can challenge new inscription 
building or lead to particular improvements in its use over time (Qu & Cooper, 2011). In our case, 
when the problem of bureaucratic constraints was addressed by the citizens involved, a number 
of new inscriptions were mobilized, as varied as presentations of the budgeting process, urban 
planning and public procurement. Notably, research group members were initiators of new 
inscriptions, therefore trying to stabilize the fragile nature of PB, where particular inscriptions 
(e.g. regalement, protocols, official applications, official responses) can easily overshadow the 
interests of one group of actors over another without a ‘referee’, i.e. the research group.  
As we observed throughout phase 4 (see Table 1), these past inscriptions led to a rather 
surprising translation of PB. A situation was observed in which the previous set of inscriptions led 
to a more constructive new inscription-building process by a newly established PB commission, 
therefore challenging the initial PB constraints and uncovering the democratic potential of PB, 
viewed as “Pandora’s box” for the municipal administration. Simultaneously, not only inscriptions 
themselves gave rise to such PB translations but also how and what kinds of divergent actors 
interact with these inscriptions (Qu & Cooper, 2011). It was noticed in our context that further PB 
translation resulted in ‘uninvited allies’ (activists and NGO members), who began to dominate the 
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internal PB process. This observation aligns with the previous literature that tends to criticize the 
“process hijacking” in PB (Kuruppu et al., 2016; Musso et al., 2011; Wampler, 2007). However, we 
observed in our case that, paradoxically, the democratic potential of PB extended well beyond 
the initial limits when internal deliberation was hijacked by activists and NGO members. In this 
sense, the democratic potential of PB was disclosed when the number of inscriptions became too 
many to control, along with undemocratic internal process formation with new ‘uninvited’ allies 
in place (NGOs and activist groups). This made an original overshadowing of interests in favor of 
the municipal authorities problematic.  
Nevertheless, as we observed in phase 5 (see Table 1), new constraints (an additional round of 
municipal council discussions) were imposed by the municipal authorities to cope with the lack of 
deliberation and credibility of the PB commission. Specifically, it was observed that, while the 
municipality continued to practice PB, the stability of inscriptions and ‘uninvited’ allies’ initiatives 
(NGOs and activist groups) was challenged by new allies (politicians) and administration. It was 
done with the use of previous inscriptions which helped reveal “process hijacking” in PB, as well 
as justify new democratic constraints while developing updated PB regalement.   
Therefore, despite the rhetorical and mediation potential of PB-related inscriptions, they are 
often unstable and fragile, with the power of inscriptions also being influenced by ‘spokesmen’. 
As shown, these ‘spokesmen’ do not easily agree among themselves, necessitating what we call 
‘external referees’. When referees (i.e. the research group) distancing itself from the selected 
municipality and therefore leaving the PB network in the quest for further expansion of PB within 
Russia, the balance of the interests of one group (citizens) of actors over another (administration) 
was biased, questioning thereby the democratic fate of PB. What follows from the above is that 
not only inscriptors and inscriptions themselves were important in the PB translation but also the 
external referee (that is, the research group), whose role was to keep both parties balanced in 
the network formed. 
So far, it is difficult to assess whether the democratic values of PB are still on top of the agenda in 
the selected municipality, since we observe new translations, making PB ever more complex with 
rising and falling democratic discourses where democratic values are closed down (via new 
regalement) and opened up (via new online ranking of PB initiatives). Perhaps more importantly, 
it is clear-cut that PB has increasingly become something other than it was expected to be at the 
outset because an increasing number of actors and inscriptions have pushed PB translation 
further. This however does not necessarily mean that democratic values of PB continue to rise.  
Conclusion  
The aim of this paper was to explore how PB has been translated within the Russian public sector. 
In so doing, it sought to extend the previous literature observations on PB by more extensively 
addressing the local specifics of its design and mobilization. More precisely, we focused on the 
relational and rhetorical work of human and non-human actors involved in the development, 
spread and acceptance of PB in Russia.  
The overall conclusion would be that PB design and mobilization within the Russian public sector 
was fragile in its nature and required many allies to push its development, spread and 
acceptance. We demonstrate PB’s fragility, via five pictures/phases of translation, as inscription 
building and network formation. More specifically, we reveal that translation of the democratic 
values of PB was highly problematic. In this sense, our study accords with the previous research 
that stresses the problematic nature of PB in terms of being overshadowed by bureaucratic and 
NPM ideologies (Ariely, 2013; Im et al., 2014; Nabatchi, 2010; Neshkova, 2014; Nyamori et al., 
2012). However, we extend this literature by emphasizing that the fragility of PB did not concern 
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the encounter of these discourses but rather its interaction, where PB needs NPM and 
bureaucratic allies in a quest to succeed. In this regard, our study shows the importance of 
understanding the inscriptions’ and various inscriptors’ roles in the design and mobilization of PB. 
Paradoxically, launching PB in Russia relied heavily on bureaucratic and even NPM inscriptions 
(allies), which it was originally supposed to fight against. Notwithstanding, while these 
inscriptions can fog the democratic values of PB, they can also uncover its democratic potential 
over time, albeit not for a long time, as the ‘external referee’ is needed. 
Our paper contributes to the public administration and accounting literature in several ways. 
Firstly, by looking at the processes of design and mobilization of PB within particular settings via 
translation theory, we contribute to the PB (e.g. Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Célérier & Cuenca 
Botey, 2015; He, 2011; Kuruppu et al., 2016) and democratic governance literature (Fung, 2015). 
More precisely, we offer a more complex view of the processes of new democratic governance 
tools’ development (Fung, 2006, 2015) in particular settings that emphasize the importance of 
non-human (inscriptions) and human actors (inscriptors) as they shape the translation of PB, 
especially when it comes to locally driven innovations. Secondly, in a broader sense, our study 
contributes to the disc ssion on bureaucracy, NPM and democratic discourses in emerging 
economies (van Helden & Uddin, 2016). Through Russia’s example, we demonstrate that, rather 
than being distinct, all these discourses are inextricably intertwined on the ground where 
seemingly alien tools of democratic governance (such as PB) can act in concert with NPM and 
bureaucracy. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is still ambiguity in the literature, whether 
PB concerns NPM, Public Governance or something else (Brun-Martos & Lapsley, 2016). Lastly, by 
investigating local practices and democratic innovations, our study contributes to the knowledge 
about the Russian public sector (Antipova & Bourmistrov, 2013; Khodachek & Timoshenko, 2017; 
Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009), shedding light on how various discourses work on the ground and 
providing avenues for international comparison. That emphasized, we propose several directions 
for future research.   
Firstly, in line with Kornberger et al. (2017), we encourage scholars to delve further into empirical 
and theoretical investigation of the encounter (or interaction) of bureaucratic, democratic and 
NPM discourses on the public-sector ground. While the political nature of PB has already been 
significantly emphasized in the previous literature, we invite scholars to reflect more on how 
nascent tools, such as PB, change (or are changed by) and link (or are linked with) these 
discourses. In this context, another research proposition is to look further into the usually ‘silent 
role’ of non-human actors within the context of new democratic tools’ design and mobilization. 
While the role of inscriptions was revealed in this study, further research may extend the 
theoretical ideas of actor-network theory and examine the role of social online platforms (e.g. 
Facebook, Twitter) in promoting the democratic values of PB. This aligns squarely with a general 
appeal to learn more about the role of IT in democracy improvements (Kornberger et al., 2017) in 
general and PB in particular (Gordon et al., 2017). As our evidence demonstrated, the online 
platform can be a promising source of additional discourses within PB that is not so easy to 
control and that may lead to an extension of PB potentials beyond the limits set.  
Thirdly, further studies may more thoroughly and carefully shed light on the role of ‘external 
referees’ (in our case, the research group) in the design and mobilization of democratic tools. 
While previous studies examined first and foremost the role of international organizations 
(Goldfrank, 2012), our study showed what various groups of actors do in order for a novel 
practice to succeed. Thus, it might be promising to trace further the changing nature of their own 
activities and their PB dissemination mechanisms. Finally, the role of the federal authorities in PB 
development is also a cause for concern. As so often in Soviet and then Russian history, the state 
may decide to impose PB all over the country by coercive measures, as is the case with most 
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reforms (e.g. Timoshenko & Adhikari, 2009). As we observed in our case, although local research-
driven PB lost its democratic potential during the translation, some unintended paradoxical 
surprises appeared. That stressed, whether such surprises continue to emerge under a federal 
umbrella to achieve PB’s stated objective – the augmented democratization of the budgetary 
process at community levels – or PB remains only an elusive goal: this is what future studies can 
in principle deal with. 
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Figure 1.  The Democratic Promises of PB Observed in Practice  
 
 
 
PB promises for the development 
of democratic values (Fung, 2015): 
1. Democratic legitimacy  
2. Effective governance 
3. Social justice 
 
PB results: 
1. External legitimacy  
2. Efficiency  
3. Marginalization and 
symbolic justice 
 
Causes: 
Political processes, power and 
domination, expertise, 
institutional logics, culture, 
diffusion, local context 
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Table 1. A Summary of Actors, Inscriptions Built, Allies and the Development of PB 
Democratic Values  
 Phase 1 
2012–2013 
Phase 2 
2013 
Phase 3 
2013-2014 
Phase 4  
2014-2015 
Phase 5 
2016-2017 
A
ct
o
rs
 
Research 
group 
Research group,  
Foundation 
Research group, 
Foundation, local 
administration, citizenry 
(PB commission) 
Research group, 
Foundation, local 
administration, 
citizenry (PB 
commission) 
Research group, 
Foundation, 
Local 
administration, 
citizenry, NGOs and 
activists’ groups 
(‘uninvited’ allies)  
In
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 e
x
a
m
p
le
s 
PB manuals; 
PB application; 
PB project 
document 
PB project 
document; 
presentations; 
newspaper 
articles; 
TV interviews; 
local laws, orders, 
programs; 
PB roadmap 
Inscriptions from phase 2 
+ 
regalement; 
protocols; 
official applications; 
official responses; 
lectures; 
learning workshops; 
online forum lines 
Inscriptions from 
phase 3 + 
calculation groups 
table; 
guidelines for project 
development; 
learning brochures; 
initiatives 
presentations, 
visualizations and 
possible sources of 
funding; 
online discussions of 
administration and 
municipal council 
decisions 
Inscriptions from 
phase 4 + new 
regalement; 
online ranking of 
initiatives;  
N
e
w
 
a
ll
ie
s 
Foundation 
 
Local 
administration, 
citizenry  
Various administration 
committees/ 
departments  
NGO and activists’ 
groups (‘uninvited’ 
allies) 
Local moderator 
Politicians 
P
B
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e
m
o
cr
a
ti
c 
v
a
lu
e
s 
Fogging 
democratic 
values of PB  
The same fogging 
democratic values 
of PB, but more 
democratic 
rhetoric mobilized 
PB as a co-production 
tool with the highly 
limited potential for real 
democratic governance 
and therefore 
democratic values 
promotion 
Extending PB 
potential for 
democratic 
governance 
Opening up and 
closing down 
democratic values 
potential of PB  
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Referee #1 
Respond for the enclosed comments (to be sent as an attachment) 
The authors have done a very good job with the revision 
and have addressed most of my concerns, as well as 
improved the flow of argument in the paper.  In 
particular, I like the authors’ decision to follow the 
advice of Lukka and Vinnari (2014) to focus on a few 
concepts in the sociology of translation to make sense 
of PB in the Russian context.  I have some relatively 
minor issues that they may want to address before the 
paper is admitted into the publication process. 
Dear reviewer, we would like to thank you sincerely for 
your work and for helping us enhance the quality of our 
manuscript with these minor comments. We have 
followed most of your comments/advice which enabled 
us to bring the flow of arguments more clearly. Below, 
we have reflected shortly on your specific comments. 
1. The link between participatory governance and 
participatory budgeting, both theoretically and 
empirically, could be developed more directly. 
Dear reviewer, thank you for this comment. In the 
revised draft of the paper, we have made a clearer link 
between participatory budgeting as one of the 
accountability tools and participatory governance which 
may strengthen democratic governance (pp. 1-5). 
Indeed, a separate section on the problematic nature of 
PB as a tool to enhance democratic governance has 
been introduced. 
2. Did the construction of the PB project application and 
its “problematization around highly demanded 
discourses of transparency and efficiency” (p. 8) clash 
either directly/indirectly with what might have been a 
symbolic exercise of the federal government to give the 
appearance of democracy? 
Dear reviewer, thank you for addressing this question. 
We would rather argue that such PB project application 
construction and problematization was the only way to 
succeed and it rather became indirectly linked with 
symbolic democratic discourse in a way that it became  
part of this democratic discourse but at the same time 
showed that it can be more effective. In this sense, 
there was an indirect clash in a way of criticizing this 
symbolic exercise of the federal government to give the 
appearance of democracy. We believe that the 
description in the current draft of the manuscript is 
clear enough to demonstrate this moment.  
3. Whose ranking placed the focus municipality “as one 
of the leading municipalities in the country”? And on 
what basis? 
Dear reviewer, thank you for asking this clarification. 
We have made a separate footnote in the current draft 
of the manuscript, referring to the Ministry of Finance’s 
ranking (see p. 11). 
4. It is not very clear what new inscriptions emerged 
and to what extent they competed with other more 
established inscriptions? That part of the story needs 
strengthening, especially in the material before the 
discussion section. 
 
Dear reviewer, we are grateful to you for this comment. 
We do completely agree with you that the story 
became too complicated at the end in the previous 
draft of the manuscript. So, we have tried to be more 
precise regarding new inscriptions identification within 
phase 4 and 5, alongside showing more clearly what we 
mean by  “they competed with other more established 
inscriptions” and to what extent. Besides that, we have 
simplified the text concerning phase 5 by deleting the 
lines on external inscriptions building. This has resulted 
in a bunch of small clarifications with extensions of the 
text.  
5. I do not see the “research question” that the authors Dear reviewer, thank you you for this comment. In the 
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referred to in the paper. revised draft of the paper, we have clearly stated our 
research question in the introductory section (p. 2) and 
in the conclusion section (p. 20).   
6. On page 4 and elsewhere, I would replace the word 
“claim” with “argue/propose”. 
Dear reviewer, thank you for this note. We have looked 
through the text and replaced the word “claim” in line 
with your suggestion.   
7. The authors should carefully read through the paper 
to catch and fix the small number of typographical and 
grammatical errors. 
Dear reviewer, thank you for this note. We have 
carefully read through the paper and fixed several 
typographical and grammatical errors. 
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Referee #2 
 
Respond for the enclosed comments (to be sent as an attachment) 
The authors have addressed most of the comments 
provided in the earlier version. I like the way the 
authors have structured their data analysis in the 
revised paper. The current paper is much improved 
compared to their earlier version. However, there are 
few more issues which I think the authors should 
address so as to make their contributions to the 
accounting literature more convincing. A key issue 
concerns with the theorisation of their study and 
demonstrating the theoretical contributions. I do not 
see the articulation of theory (translation of ideas), 
mainly in the discussion section. Following comments 
may help the authors fill some of the gaps that I have 
envisaged in the current version. 
Dear reviewer, we appreciate the additional comments 
that helped us make our main arguments more 
convincing for contribution to the accounting and pubic 
administration literature. Specifically, we have worked 
with the clarification of our theoretical ambition and 
methods used to fulfill this ambition. Our efforts have 
been mostly directed to improve the introduction and 
the theory section, which led to some alterations in the 
final sections. We have elaborated on your particular 
comments below in the following way.    
The introduction needs to be a bit more focused and 
coherent. Many issues have been raised in this section, 
but there is still a lack of problematisation (for instance, 
why is it important to study the transla ion of PB in a 
specific setting and how this understanding would 
contribute to extant work on the PB) and 
contextualisation (reflection on the specific context in 
which PB was proposed). The authors may think of 
developing a separate literature review section on PB.  
Dear reviewer, thank you for these comments. We 
share your concern regarding coherency; many issues 
raised that lack a clear problematization. In this regard, 
we have followed your advice on developing a separate 
section where we have reflected on the current PB 
literature and its link with democratic governance 
agenda (pp. 3-4).  This has helped us articulate the gap 
and our theoretical ambition has been to contribute to 
the literature on “PB as a democratic governance tool” 
with the use of actor-network theory. In addition, this 
has enabled us to make the introduction more focused, 
consistent and giving the main arguments for our 
research question.  
Provide more clarity how the theory (a sociology of 
translation) has been applied in the study. What is the 
theoretical question here? Arguments such as the 
simplicity of other theories being a driving force for the 
selection of this theory are not convincing (page 4).  To 
what extent the sociology of translation is 
similar/different to ANT (actor network theory). How 
are the parts/particular concepts of the theory 
mobilised in the study (page 5)? How are the 
inscriptions used to problematise the need for PB in this 
particular case (page 6)? Answering all these concerns 
may require the authors to further develop their 
theoretical section. 
Dear reviewer, thank you for these comments. We 
share your concerns here. We have attempted to make 
a clearer point on why and how we use ANT and its 
central concept of translation in the revised draft (see 
pp. 5-7). Sorry for confusing you as a reader by not 
referring to ANT directly. In our article, we indeed refer 
to sociology of translation as ANT, so in the updated 
version we have made it clear that there is no confusion 
in this regard. In addition, we have provided a definition 
of translation and use it throughout the text. We have 
also endeavored to be careful with the use of 
‘translation of idea(s)’ since it can make the readers 
think of ‘travel of ideas’ or ‘translation of PB idea’ as a 
literary concept which refers to changing 
meaning/design of PB. In our paper, the term 
‘translation’ is more about processes of network 
formations related to PB as a result of interaction 
between human and non-human actors. 
We would like to stress that, in order to be more 
conscious of our theoretical ambition and 
contributions, we have made a distinction between 
domain theory and method theory (Lukka and Vinnari, 
2014). Domain theory, in our paper, refers particularly 
to a set of knowledge on the problematic nature of PB 
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for the development of democratic values in modern 
governments.  Method theory is presented through 
ANT as a meta-level conceptual system, which can offer 
alternative perspectives, with added new insights 
(Lukka and Vinnari, 2014) for studying the underlying 
processes behind PB design and mobilisation in 
particular settings. 
The method section requires some discussion how the 
theory has been mobilised to make sense of data. 
Dear reviewer, we are grateful for this comment. We 
have reflected on your concerns in the method section 
of the manuscript (pp. 7-8).  
The empirical section should provide some contextual 
details/background prior to data analysis, including the 
traditional approach to budgeting in the selected local 
government. How is the administrative/budgeting 
structure of this local government? In what sense the 
proposed PB was different from the traditional 
approach to budgeting being practiced in the selected 
local government. Are there any specific procedures set 
out for the PB? I can see that the PB rhetoric is hijacked 
and citizens are marginalised in the process. The 
authors should mobilise the theory (the ideas of 
translation) to bring out the PB process. 
Dear reviewer, thank you for this comment. In line with 
your wishes, some contextual background information 
has been incorporated in the text (see section 
“Empirical background” on pp. 8-10). This info includes, 
but is not limited to, the administrative structure of the 
selected municipality and the traditional budgeting 
process there. Besides that, we have tried our best, in 
the revised draft, to mobilize ANT with its concept of 
translation to bring out the PB process.        
The Russian specific context may have impacted on the 
PB becoming something else. All these require the 
authors to articulate discussion how the PB was 
understood at the initial stages (when it is proposed) 
and the convergence of ideas during the process of 
translation.  Such an attempt to contextualise and 
theorise the case should be central to the discussion 
and conclusion sections. I don't see any analysis in the 
current version to see how the translation of PB is 
implicated in process. 
Dear reviewer, thank you for these comments. We 
understand your concerns about contextualization and 
theorization. We do agree with you completely that 
Russian specific context may have impacted on the PB 
becoming something else. In the revised draft, we have 
provided an overview of particular theories which were 
previously used in order to study PB in specific contexts 
of other countries, including an understanding of PB 
from institutional theory, cultural theory and diffusion 
process. We would like to stress here that we do not 
endeavor to make a discussion of “how the PB was 
understood at the initial stages (when it was 
proposed)” and further on. Rather we have brought 
observations on the development of democratic values 
of PB traced via interaction of actors. Our attempt to 
contextualize and theorize the case is based on seeing 
the PB development as translation - a process of human 
(inscriptors) and non-human (inscriptions) interactions 
in relation to PB over time. In this way, in the discussion 
section, we have reflected on how these human and 
non-human interactions led to the formation of 
democratic values of PB on each phase.  We have 
shown several pictures with the key message of 
importance of an understanding of inscriptions’ and 
various human actors’ role on democratic 
developments. In the revised draft, we have tried to 
make this flow of arguments through empirics, 
discussion and conclusion sections. 
Hope these comments help the authors! They did, thank you! 
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